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This paper presents an empirical assessment of the degree of competition within the Jamaican 
banking sector during the period 1998 to 2007.  The popular H-statistic by Panzar and Rosse 
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1. Introduction 
The level of competition in the banking sector of any economy has a major impact on 
consumer welfare and economic growth through its influence on bank performance and the 
stability of the financial sector. Undoubtedly, this partly explains the plethora of academic 
articles in recent years that have examined competition in banking from various perspectives 
and for different geographical regions.  Changes in the competitive structure of the banking 
industry may occur in response to local or global stimuli such as financial liberalisation, 
deregulation, technological advancements, crises, internationalisation or harmonisation.  
Therefore, it is an invaluable exercise that is better able to provide an assessment of measures 
of competition for regulation and policy formulation at the micro and macro levels. 
 The liberalisation of the Jamaican economy in the early 1990s, the experience of 
financial crises in the mid- to late-1990s, the enhancement of information technologies and 
the imminent establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) are 
expected to have contributed or will contribute to changes in the financial sector. These 
structural and other changes experienced and expected, carry cogent implications for 
competition and, ultimately, stability of the banking and financial sector and the wider 
economy.  Of course, the impact of the wave of instability resulting from the global financial 
crisis beginning around 2007 cannot be ignored as this will undoubtedly impact the 
metamorphosis already taking place within Jamaica’s banking and financial sector. 
 The purpose of this paper is to undertake an empirical assessment of the degree of 
market power within the Jamaican banking sector during the period 1998 to 2007.  Among 
the most widely used methods to assess degrees of competition in banking is the model 
popularised by Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1987) (P-R model). The P-R 
model assesses the degree of market power on the basis of a reduced form equation that 
explains revenue in terms of factor input prices and other explanatory variables.  However, 
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this model, which has been widely used in the literature, has been challenged by a new strand 
appearing in the literature on two main grounds.  The first basis of the challenge is that it is 
mis-specified.  For example, Bikker et al. (2006) argue that the revenue equation is mis-
specified since it is effectively reduced to a ‘price equation if the logarithm of relative income 
is taken as the dependent variable’ as is the case in much of the extant literature.  This, they 
note, has important far-reaching implications for the H- statistic and its interpretation.  They 
further argue that similar misspecification occurs with the use of covariates that reflect scale 
(such as the natural logarithm of total assets) and that the use of such a scaling variable 
renders the equation ‘indistinguishable from a price equation.’  The second point of challenge 
is that the model equation of Panzar and Rosse is static and presumes equilibrium or 
instantaneous adjustment to equilibrium at each point in time when the data are observed. For 
example, Goddard and Wilson (2009) note that the reality is not in line with this presumption 
as adjustment towards equilibrium is often not instantaneous and markets are therefore not 
necessarily in equilibrium and recommend a dynamic estimation model.  
Accordingly, for our empirical assessment of market power within the Jamaican 
banking sector we seek to assess market power using nine alternative specifications of the 
empirical models.  The objectives of this are three-fold. First, it affords testing for 
equilibrium within the Jamaican banking sector over the period and therefore an appropriate 
interpretation of the results. Second, it affords robust comparison of the degree of 
competitiveness among Jamaican banks between 1998 and 2007. Third, comparison with the 
findings of other studies allows for informed policy making.  The data set consists of an 
unbalanced panel of eleven banks: five merchant banks and six commercial banks. The 
findings are indicative of low levels of competition maintained by a few banks restricting 
competition, but the data is unable to pin down the exact competitive structure which mostly 
lies between monopolistic competition and monopoly (or conjectural variations of oligopoly). 
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The next section outlines the background to Jamaica’s banking sector. Section 3 
reviews the literature and the methodology on bank competitiveness. Section 4 discusses the 
model strategy and data. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 some concluding 
remarks. 
2. The Jamaican Banking Sector 1998 to 2007 
Jamaica’s network of banks is fairly well-developed and diversified consisting of the Bank of 
Jamaica (BoJ – the Central Bank), commercial banks, merchant banks, non-banking financial 
firms and development banks. In Jamaica’s liberalised financial environment, banks operate 
within a relatively small market and therefore expect tough competition.  Despite an 
expansion in the number of merchant banks in the early 1990s, the ‘traditional’ commercial 
banks dominate both in terms of their geographical presence through branches across the 
island and also by share of total banking assets (see Table 1). 
Prior to 1998, in the height of the financial crisis, Jamaica’s banking sector changed 
with the exit of several banks.  The crisis resulted in a transformation of the sector, 
significantly reducing the number and types of banks with resulting changes in ownership.  
The structural changes that took place within Jamaica’s banking sector over the period 1998 
to 2007 included a number of mergers and eventual consolidations in 1999, acquisitions by 
foreign stakeholders in 2001, transfer of assets and liabilities to other entities and licences 
surrendered in 2002 and 2003, further mergers in 2004 and more licences surrendered in 
2007.  At the end of 2007, 6 of the 10 banks operating had majority foreign ownership.   The 
relative number of mergers, consolidations and acquisitions that occurred during the 1990s 
and in the new century suggests an increase in concentration and worsening of competition.  
In general our findings confirm this. 
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Table 1: Share of Total Banking Assets by Category of Banks¥ 
 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
Commercial  458,860.40  400,700.40  351,428.50  327,034.70  301,483.90  250,320.20  220,345.30  207,801.10  184,336.80  147,750.80  
% of total  92 91 89 88 92 85 95 98 98 96 
           
Merchant 41,394.60  40,346.70  41,330.30  46,698.80  26,645.20  43,169.00  12,014.20  4,192.40  3,830.10  6,685.70  
% of total  8 9 11 12 8 15 5 2 2 4 
           
Local 66,823.40  61,927.90  58,103.30  60,012.20  34,706.90  46,402.40  125,803.00  117,973.90  108,580.00  83,875.40  
% of total  13 14 15 16 11 16 54 56 58 54 
           
Foreign 433,431.60  379,119.20  334,655.50  313,721.30  293,422.20  247,086.80  106,556.50  94,019.60  79,586.90  70,561.10  
% of total  87 86 85 84 89 84 46 44 42 46 
           
Top 3 382,849.60  334,218.90  298,767.20  281,789.70  263,692.20  221,463.20  193,012.40  185,158.10  166,697.70  133,055.50  
% of total  77 76 76 75 80 75 83 87 89 86 
           
 Lower 3 96,254.70  85,045.00  71,974.60  72,136.30  51,604.90  46,768.30  24,349.00  17,045.50  13,881.40  14,163.80  
% of total  19 19 18 19 16 16 10 8 7 9  
 
      
Source: Authors’ calculations 
¥Assets measured in millions of Jamaica Dollars 
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3. Measuring market power in Banks 
As noted above, we utilize the popular model of Panzar and Rosse with adjustments 
recommended by Bikker et al. (2006) and Goddard and Wilson (2009). Earlier studies 
on bank competition may be classified into one of the two schools of the structural 
and the non-structural approaches. Many early studies on market power within 
banking took the form of structure-conduct-performance (SCP) analysis or the 
efficient-structure hypothesis (ESH).1 The Panzar-Rosse (P-R) model is from a new 
school – the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) models that were 
developed to address the shortcomings of the early approaches.2 NEIO models 
measure the impact of monopoly and oligopoly power by estimating the deviation 
between marginal cost and competitive pricing without explicitly using the market 
structure indicator. The Rosse-Panzar reduced-form revenue model and the 
Bresnahan-Lau mark-up model are two important methods in this strand of literature. 
Both approaches are derived from profit-maximizing equilibrium conditions.  
However, Shaffer (2004) notes that the Rosse-Panzar model is preferable as it is 
robust even in small empirical samples and works well with firm-specific data on 
revenues and factor prices without requiring information about equilibrium output 
prices and quantities for the industry.  
The model by Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987) as 
well as the extension to banking by Nathan and Neave (1989) and Perrakis (1991) 
assumes that firms can enter or leave rapidly any market without losing their capital, 
and that potential competitors possess the same cost functions as firms that already 
serve in the market.  The test of the model is based on the properties of a reduced 
form log-linear revenue equation for a panel data set of banks of the following type: 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Bikker (2004) for an overview of these approaches. 
2 See, for example, Berger (1995), Berger et al.(1997) and Paul (1999) for discussion of the shortcomings. 
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where R = the revenue of bank i at time t,  
w = the Jth input price for each bank,  
X = K bank-specific variables that affect the banks’ revenue and cost functions,  
Z = N macro variables that affect the banking market as a whole, and  
e is a stochastic term.   
The stylized bank-specific variables which have been used by researchers in 
these equations are a measure the riskiness of the bank's overall portfolio, a proxy for 
size and the extent of diversification effect, and the ratio of the number of branches of 
each bank to the total number of branches of the whole banking system (viewed as a 
traditional way of maintaining market share by providing consumers with close-
quarter access to financial services, and mitigating, to some extent, price 
competition).3  
The H-statistic is calculated from the reduced form revenue equation and 
measures the sum of elasticities of total revenue of the banks with respect to the 
banks’ input prices.  In the context of equation (1), å
=
=
J
j
jH
1
a .  Rosse and Panzar 
(1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987) outline certain conditions from which 
inferences may be drawn about the structure of the market. Table 2 summarises these 
theoretical underpinnings of the main theory for measuring competitive condition and 
contestability in the banking market, when using a revenue equation and when using a 
price equation. However, the specification approach characteristic in the extant 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Northcott (2004). Notably, branching has cost implications, so there is a trade-off between 
maintaining market share and increasing cost of branch maintenance.  
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literature on banking competition involves the ‘rescaling’ of the dependent variable 
through division by total assets or inclusion as a control variable.  Bikker et al. (2006) 
suggest that this inadvertent misspecification of the revenue equation as a price 
equation ‘leads to wrong inference about the market structure and the degree of 
competitiveness through a strong bias of H towards one’.  
 Table 2: Alternative theories and interpretations of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
Competitive conditions 
 
Revenue Equation Price Equation 
H=0  
 
 
 
 
 
H = 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 < H < 1 
 
 
H > 1 
Monopoly or conjectural variations short -
run oligopoly (increase in input prices 
will increase marginal costs, reduce 
equilibrium output and subsequently 
reduce total firm revenue) 
 
Perfect competition or natural monopoly 
in a perfectly contestable market or sales 
maximising firm subject to a break even 
constraint (any increase in input prices 
increases both marginal and average costs 
without altering the optimal output of any 
individual firm) 
 
Monopolistic competition 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
Perfect competition or natural 
monopoly in a perfectly contestable 
market or sales maximising firm 
subject to a break even constraint  
 
 
 
 
Monopoly or conjectural variations 
short-run oligopoly 
 
Monopolistic competition 
 
An important feature of a correctly identified H-statistic using an estimated 
revenue equation is the long-run market equilibrium assumption. This suggests that 
competitive capital markets will equalise risk-adjusted rates of return across banks 
such that, in equilibrium, rates of returns should be uncorrelated with input prices. To 
test for equilibrium, equation (1) is calculated replacing the dependent variable total 
revenue in with return on assets,p , as shown in equation (2): 
  å å å
= = =
+¢+¢+¢+¢=
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(2) 
Here, 0
1
=¢= å
=
J
j
jE a  indicates long-run equilibrium; and E < 0, indicates 
disequilibrium.   
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Much of the extant literature utilise the ‘mis-specified’ equation discussed 
above and reflects an H-statistic with a bias towards one, suggesting a prevalence of 
monopolistic competition in many markets.4 Unfortunately, there remains is a paucity 
of research on critical banking issues for Jamaica. The single known study of 
competition among Jamaican banks also applies the ‘misspecification’ noted above. 
Duncan and Langrin (2004) examined competition in the commercial banking market 
over the thirteen-year period 1989 to 2002 using quarterly panel data. Using total 
interest revenue to total assets as the dependent variable, their results indicate 
declining competition in the banking market in the presence of monopolistic 
competition.  
4. Measuring bank competitiveness in Jamaica: data and model strategy  
Due to the lack of detailed information on factor prices, much is imputed from 
accounting information for measuring levels of competition in banking. We utilise 
annual audited unconsolidated financial data and, because we favour a more 
homogenous sample, focus on Jamaican commercial and merchant banks only, 
between 1998 and 2007.5 Data were obtained from publicly available resources, 
including Bankscope, financial statements and Annual Reports, the website of the 
respective banks, the website of the Central Bank, and media reports.6  Notably, all 
the banks now use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to report 
financial information. 7 Data was not consistently available for all banks; in a few 
                                                 
4 Bikker and Haaf (2002) find monopolistic competition the prevailing market structure in 100 of 101 countries. 
See also Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) for a summary of results from other studies.  
5 Unconsolidated means data relating to the bank entity only, excluding other group companies.   
6 Bankscope database, maintained by Bureau Van Dijk, provides financial and other data for over 29,000 banks 
worldwide. 
7 IFRS were adopted in Jamaica for financial year-end reporting on or after July 2002.  Some financial statements 
have therefore been reported using the local accounting standards (Local GAAP) previously in use for a part of the 
sample period.  Daley (2004) and Daley (2002) discuss the likely impact of the change. 
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instances a number of working assumptions had to be made to fill gaps in the data.8  
In the final analysis we therefore used an unbalanced panel of 11 banks.   In the case 
of mergers, the banks are treated as two separate entities until the point of merger; 
thereafter, only one bank is reported.9 
The sample used in this study is comprised of a small number of banks that 
constitute the majority of the population and market and asset share, over ten years. 
The sample period 1998 to 2007 spans a period of continuing structural change 
resulting from crisis in the Jamaican banking sector during the early to mid-1990s.  
Any operational and profit variances occurring would significantly influence overall 
revenue and profitability levels.  While the macroeconomic environment has not been 
identified as a cause of failure during the Jamaican banking crisis, it was 
acknowledged that a weak macroeconomic environment could render marginal banks 
infeasible (see, for example, Daley, 2007).  For this reason, the final equations (3) and 
(5) include a time series variable, either real GDP growth rate (RGDP) or, 
alternatively, a full set of individual year dummy variables.10   
In response to the challenge noted above, we focus at the outset on identifying 
any departure from the critical P-R assumption of long-run equilibrium in the banking 
market.  Using an empirical test for equilibrium described in (2) above, we compute 
the dependent variable as )1ln( ROA+  as shown in equation (3), since our sample 
includes small negative values.11 
ittititititit
itititititit
uRGDPPEROWNBrSIZENLASS
DLNSKASSPFPKPLROA
+++++++
+++++=+
176543
213210
lnlnln
lnlnlnlnln)1ln(
gbbbbb
bbaaaa
 
 (3) 
                                                 
8 These assumptions are ‘conditioning’ factors that should be taken into account when interpreting the results, but 
are not pervasive.   
9 There is an assumption that the merged banks assume similar strategy with respect to its competitive stance and 
business mix (see, for example, Kishan and Opiela (2000); Hempell (2002). 
10 Coccorese (2004) recognises the role of macroeconomic indicators in assessing bank competition in Italy.  
11 See also Claessens and Laeven (2004) for use of the log of the adjusted ROA as a dependent variable. 
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where i denotes banks i=1,…N; and t denotes time t=1,…T. The variables are defined 
as follows: 
 
ROA   return on assets measured by profits after tax divided by total assets 
PL  personnel expenses to number of employees (unit price of labour) 
PK  capital expenses to fixed assets (unit price of capital) 
PF  ratio of interest expenses to total customer deposits (unit price of 
funds) 
KASS  ratio of capital to assets, measuring funding risk (leverage) 
DLNS  ratio of deposits to loans, measuring business risk 
NLASS ratio of net loans to assets, measuring portfolio risk 
SIZE  total bank assets 
Br  ratio of bank branches to total bank branches per year 
 
OWN is a dummy variable taking a value of 0 or 1 local or foreign ownership, 
respectively and PER is a dummy variable taking the value 0 for the period 1998 to 
2000 and 1 thereafter.  The model assumes a one-way error component as described 
by: 
itiitu uh +=          
 (4)                                                                                            
where ih is the bank-specific effect and itu is an IID random error. The banking market 
is deemed to be in equilibrium if E = 0321 =¢+¢+¢ aaa . Five specifications of 
Equation (3) are tested on the data from our unbalanced panel using the fixed effects 
estimator to allow for heterogeneity across the sample of banks.  Table 3 summarises 
the various models constructed. Model 1 is the full equation shown in (3); model 2 
includes lags of the factor prices; model 3 introduces individual year dummies to 
replace the variables PER and RGDP; model 4 is a combination of models 2 and 3; 
and model 5 is equation (3) excluding the regressor SIZEln .    
Since all specifications of the FE profit equation reject 0:0 =EH  (see below), 
suggesting disequilibrium in the banking market, how then should we model the 
revenue equation as an inference to market power?  Goddard and Wilson (2009) 
suggest that the answer to that question is the dynamic revenue equation that includes 
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the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. Following their example, we re-specify 
the full dynamic revenue condition as:12 
itt
ititititit
itititititit
RGDP
PEROWNBrNLASSDLNS
KASSRPFPKPLR
eg
bbbbb
bbaaaa
+D+
D+D+D+D+D+
D+D+D+D+D+=D -
1
76543
2113210
lnlnln
lnlnlnlnlnln
 (5)
            
   itiit v+= me        (6) 
where R = total bank revenue, measured by total income (TI) or interest income (II), 
all other variables are as defined above, im denotes the unobservable bank-specific 
effect and itv denotes a random term which is assumed to be IID. The long-run 
(dynamic) H-statistic is given by ( ) ( )1321 1 baaa -++=H .  Four specifications of 
Equation (5) are tested on the data from our unbalanced panel using the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator as proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991).13 Table 4 summarises the various models constructed. Model 1 is the 
full equation shown in the (5). Model 2 introduces individual year dummies to replace 
the variables PER and RGDP. As a robustness test, we re-estimate models 1 and 2 
with interest income instead of total income as the dependent variable in models 3 and 
4.  All models are estimated using the one-step GMM estimator as well as the robust 
one-step GMM estimator.14  
5. Empirical results and analysis 
As a first step we assess whether the banking market is deemed to be in 
equilibrium.  To do this, we compare the E-statistics obtained from the five variants of 
                                                 
12 The re-specified equation addresses the mis-specifications noted by Bikker et al. (2006) and concurred by 
Goddard and Wilson (2009).  These are mis-specifications regarding the ‘scaling’ of the dependent variable 
(dividing by total assets) or the inclusion of a ‘scaled’ covariate, lnSIZE, that lead to flawed conclusions in the 
interpretation of the H-statistic.   
13 We opt for GMM since the use of a ‘static’ estimator such as FE may lead to bias in the estimates (see, for 
example, Goddard and Wilson, 2009). 
14 Arellano and Bond (1991) note that the one-step estimator is only valid for IID errors while the robust one-step 
estimator is also valid for general heteroskedasticity over individual[s] [banks] over time. 
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the P-R profit equation (3) outlined in Table 3.  Table 3 summarises the results 
obtained by applying FE estimation to the various model specifications. We also 
report the E-statistic estimates, along with Wald F-statistics and probabilities for the 
null hypothesis, 0:0 =EH over the period 1998 to 2007.  For parsimony, the final 
models have been determined by strict variable deletion on statistical grounds.  
We apply the Wald F-test applied to the models and consistently reject the 
null hypothesis of long-run equilibrium at a 99% significance level.  Table 3 shows 
that the sum of the input price elasticities of the factors, are significantly different 
from zero for all specifications.  Based on the fixed effects specification, the Jamaican 
banking market is shown to be in long-run disequilibrium from 1998 to 2007.  A 
possible explanation of the inability to identify equilibrium in the Jamaican banking 
sector over the 10-year period is the dynamic changes that have taken place in the 
sector since the crisis.15 
To assess the degree of competition in the Jamaican banking sector, we then 
examine the value of the Rosse-Panzar H-statistic and apply usual statistical 
framework to test hypotheses as set out in Table 2.16  Table 4 reports the estimated 
values of H for each of the four model specifications based on equation (5) with 
results for the one-step estimator as well as the robust one-step estimator. 
We focus initially on columns 2 to 5 in table 4 which describe the estimates 
for total income as the dependent variable.  From these columns we observe that of 
the three input prices, the unit price of funds (PF) is always significant at 
conventional levels of significance, suggesting that the cost of funds is an important 
contributor to total income. Furthermore, the large positive coefficient suggests that it 
                                                 
15 We recognise that equilibrium may not hold for the entire period but that it may do for sub-periods as the 
consistent rejection of H0:E = 0 may only suggest the presence of defined structural break(s) with different periods 
of ‘equilibrium.’ The small sample constrained our ability to test this hypothesis.  
16 We apply the Wald F-test to these hypotheses: H0:H=0; H0:0<H<1; H0:H=1. See Table 2 for explanations. 
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was the main contributor to H.  The unit price of fixed capital, PK, was never 
statistically significant in any of the robust estimates and the small coefficient of the 
unit price of labour varied in sign.  The strong positive coefficient on Br shows 
significant market share effects on total income.  This highlights that the positive 
effects of maintaining market share outweigh the costs of maintaining additional 
branches and therefore implies that a greater number of branches should lead to a net 
overall increase in total income.  It also suggests that the Jamaican banking sector is 
not over-branched and could possibly benefit from an expansion. The variable DLNS, 
which is a proxy for business mix appears important to total income based on its 
occurrence and significance for all estimates except for the robust estimates of models 
1 and 4. The significant positive coefficients on this variable are in line with 
expectations since the provision of additional deposits makes available more funding 
for lending and the provision of more loans would, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase 
in revenue.  The significant negative coefficient of OWN on total revenue suggests 
that foreign ownership is inversely related to income generating capability.  This 
finding contrasts with expectations and anecdotal evidence that foreign-owned banks 
in Jamaica are more profitable.  Of course, it could be that foreign-owned banks 
actually earn less income than locally-owned banks but they are also more efficient at 
cost management and therefore achieve higher net profits. The coefficient on PER in 
column suggests that the post-crisis period has had the expected positive effect on 
total income.  
Columns 2 to 5 of table 4 also show that the estimated H-statistics fall between 
0.25 and 0.40.We firmly reject H=1 or the perfectly competitive banking market for 
Jamaica over the sample period using the one-step results for both models (at 10% 
level of significance). However,  H=0 cannot be rejected using the one-step or robust 
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one-step in Model 1 and the robust one-step in Model 2. Therefore, based on the 
GMM estimator using total income as the dependent variable, the Rosse-Panzar H-
statistic for the one-step model suggests that the Jamaican banking market as a whole 
was characterised by monopolistic competition between 1998 and 2007, while the 
robust one-step model failed to provide a clear indication (in the statistical sense) of 
the competitive structure of the banking market. However, the point estimates of the 
H-statistic suggest a very low level of competitiveness. The main results using total 
revenue as the dependent variable is that the indications as to the structure of the 
Jamaican banking sector over the period 1998 to 2007 are mixed.  The low H-
statistics suggest that the Jamaican banking sector was increasingly controlled by one 
or a few dominant banks over the period. 
From columns 6 to 9 in table 4 we observe the results for the estimates using 
interest revenue as the dependent variable.  We focus on a number of striking 
differences.  First, the coefficient of the risk proxy, NLASS, shows strong and positive 
influence on interest income indicating that greater risk is associated with greater net 
return.  Second, the coefficient  on the lagged dependent variable was significant for 
all specifications and estimators and the effect on interest income generating capacity 
was more robust than on total income. Third, bank-specific variables such as Br and 
OWN are not statistically significant suggesting that the market share and ownership 
benefits apparent on total income do not follow through to net income.  
Estimated H-statistic for the interest income equations range from 0.14 to 
0.27. While H=0 cannot be rejected in any of the models at conventional significance 
levels, we also cannot reject H=1.  Testing for the boundary values of H, the results 
support the findings that monopoly or perfect collusion cannot be rejected. A grid 
search for the boundary values of the H-statistic was conducted by searching over the 
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range [-1, 1], the results of which are shown in table 4. The process involved testing 
for the limits for which the value of H can be rejected at the 90% or higher level of 
confidence. At best, the results for model 3 and 4 and the robust one-step results for 
models 1 and 2 indicate perfect competition and at worst, monopoly or collusive 
behaviour. In this paper, we concur with the views of Bikker and Haaf (2002) and 
interpret H as a continuous measure of the level of competition with higher values 
indicating stronger competition than lower values. We note the low values of H in 
columns 6 to 9 of table 4 as the best unbiased estimates. Using this principle we can 
infer low competition and an inference to cartelisation despite the ‘indeterminate’ 
nature of the significance tests.  The low H-statistics are supported by the inability to 
reject H=0 at the conventional 5% level of significance in any of the equations. There 
is therefore sound basis for the inference that a few banks restrict competition and 
consequently weaken the influence of other banks.   
In general, our broad conclusion is inconsistent with the findings of Duncan 
and Langrin (2004) who reported the Jamaican banking market as reflecting 
monopolistic competition over the period 1989 to 2002.  However, the 
cartelisation/collusion conclusion is consistent with the findings of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of their study which suggested that there was a decline in 
competition among Jamaican banks after the crisis.  Furthermore, although the 
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic ‘rejected monopoly/perfect collusion in favour of 
monopolistic competition for the entire sample period,’ Duncan and Langrin (2004) 
note that ‘… there was a steady decline in competition throughout the specified 
sample period’.  While we may try to attribute the different inferences from the H-
statistic to the variation of sample periods (both in terms of the frequency of the data 
and the actual years covered) and sample size, a more pointed explanation remains.  
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Notably, the P-R model estimated by Duncan and Langrin (2004) is the ‘mis-
specified’ equation discussed earlier.  The equation estimated is in fact a price 
equation as noted by Bikker et al. (2006) and therefore 0<H<1 should be interpreted 
as monopoly or conjectural variations short-run oligopoly instead of monopolistic 
competition (see table 2).     
Evidently, competition in Jamaican banking has weakened over the full 
sample period 1998 to 2007 whether or not non- interest income is included in the  
assessment of bank performance along with core business (interest income).  Despite 
the overall low H-statistics for the models with total income as well as those with 
interest income, we note that the models with total income showed slightly higher 
statistics.  The implication of this is that, although alteration of the product-mix of 
banking services did not have a significant effect on overall market power within 
Jamaica’s banking sector, the non- interest income segment showed slightly less 
reduction in competitiveness.17 The lack of competitiveness in the interest income 
segment of bank earnings has seen Jamaican banks making a strategic decision to 
develop this area of business and to seek to ‘corner’ the market along with one or two 
other major players.  However, Llewellyn (2005) notes that the 'bundling' of bank 
services in Britain may have resulted in opposite movements in competitiveness 
within each segment.  
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have examined the structure of the Jamaican bank sector and sought 
to draw inferences about market power.  The Panzar-Rosse E-statistics of various 
fixed effects models suggested that the Jamaican banking market was characterised by 
disequilibrium over the period 1998 to 2007. In other words, there was some 
                                                 
17 de Young and Roland (2001) in an empirical study of US banks argue that the trend to off-balance sheet activity 
increases bank earnings volatility because of high competitive rivalry in these markets. 
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correlation between rates of return on banking assets and the prices of factor inputs. 
This finding necessitated the use of a dynamic estimator to be applied to a dynamic 
revenue equation for market power inferences.  In this paper we have applied the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator to the dynamic Panzar-Rosse revenue 
equation.  
We have presented a number of GMM models for estimating market power 
within the Jamaican banking sector during the period 1998 to 2007.  Regression 
results and goodness of fit are satisfactory.  E and H-statistics appear robust and 
hardly affected by specialisation choice.  In general, the findings of the robust one-
step estimator are consistent with those of the one-step estimator. Evidently, these 
models could also be useful to a variety of policy decisions relating to banks. 
The period 1998 to 2007 spans the end of a period of crisis within Jamaica’s 
banking sector to the post-crisis phase and embraces various structural, reporting and 
legislative changes.  Our results suggest that over this period, Jamaica’s banking 
market may have been characterized by cartelisation where a few banks have 
continued to exercise dominance in the market.  While the low level of competition 
with the Jamaican banking sector may have secured premium profits for dominant 
players, the impact on customer welfare cannot be ignored.  With the current trends 
and challenges in global markets, it is apposite that current policy decisions focus on 
levels of competition within Jamaica’s banking sector. The literature would benefit 
from any future work that analyses a longer period of data in which case it may be 
possible to arrive at more conclusive results. 
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Table 3: P-R profit models: Specifications and results  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
   
 
 
 
Eqn. 3 
 
 
Eqn. (3) + lagged 
factor prices  
 
 
Eqn. (3) + year 
dummies -  
RGDP, PER 
 
Eqn. 3 + lagged 
factor prices + 
year dummies –  
PER, RGDP 
Eqn. (3) - lnSIZE  
 
FE RESULTS     
Intercept 
 
lnPL 
 
lnPF 
 
lnPK 
 
lnKASS 
 
lnSIZE 
 
lnBr 
 
PER 
 
 
Nobs 
Nbank 
ÊF  
F(H0:E=0)  
Market 
Condition  
F-statistic 
F(H0: 0=ih ) 
0.239 
(8.20)*** 
0.04 
(5.37)*** 
0.014 
(2.86)*** 
-0.000 
(-0.16) 
0.025 
(5.46)*** 
-0.015 
(-5.42)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
90 
11 
0.05 
F(1,74)=26.49*** 
 
Disequilibrium 
18.11*** 
F(10,74)=6.17*** 
0.239 
(8.20)*** 
0.04 
(5.37)*** 
0.014 
(2.86)*** 
-0.000 
(-0.16) 
0.025 
(5.46)*** 
-0.015 
(-5.42)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
90 
11 
0.05 
F(1,74)=26.49*** 
 
Disequilibrium 
18.11*** 
F(10,74)=6.17*** 
0.065 
(3.15)*** 
0.063 
(6.18)*** 
0.008 
(1.56)  
0.003 
(0.97)  
0.036 
(8.12)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
90 
11 
0.07 
F(1,66)=34.2*** 
 
Disequilibrium 
9.20*** 
F(10,66)=7.40*** 
0.037 
(1.38)  
0.056 
(5.18)*** 
0.006 
(1.13)  
0.003 
(0.79)  
0.035 
(7.95)*** 
- 
- 
-0.010 
(-1.65)* 
- 
- 
 
90 
11 
0.06 
F(1,65)=22.3*** 
 
Disequilibrium 
8.96*** 
F(10,65)=6.83*** 
0.036 
(1.20)  
0.026 
(2.83)*** 
0.007 
(1.21)  
-0.002 
(-0.59) 
0.03 
(6.17)*** 
- 
- 
-0.022 
(-3.87)*** 
-0.009 
(-1.54) 
 
90 
11 
0.03 
F(1,73)=6.16** 
 
Disequilibrium 
12.47*** 
F(10,73)=5.46*** 
Notes: 
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% 
RGDP, PER, SIZE as defined above 
Nobs is the number of bank-year observations used  
Nbank is the number of banks for which data are available  
ÊF is the estimated E-statistic using the fixed effects (FE) estimator  
F(H0:E=0) is the F test of null hypothesis H0:E=0 
F(H0: 0=ih ) is the F test of null hypothesis that the fixed effects are zero  
Time dummies included in models 3 and 4 
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Table 4 P-R Dynamic revenue models: Specifications and results  
Equation Model 1: Eqn.(5):  R = Total Income (TI)  Model 2:Eqn. (5):R = TI + year 
dummies - RGDP, PER 
Model 3: Eqn. (5): R=Interest Income 
(II) 
Model 4:Eqn. (5): R=II + year 
dummies -RGDP, PER 
Variable  
(first difference) 
 
One-step 
Robust  
One-step  
 
One-step 
Robust  
One-step  
 
One-step 
Robust  
One-step  
 
One-step 
Robust  
One-step  
Intercept 
 
lnRt-1 
 
lnPL 
 
lnPF 
 
lnPK 
 
lnNLASS 
 
lnDLNS 
 
lnBr 
 
OWN 
 
PER 
 
 
Nobs 
Nbank 
H-value  
F test H=0 
F test H=1 
Sargan 
AR(2) 
 
Grid search 
 
 
Market condition 
 0.175  
(6.82)*** 
 0.195  
(2.08)** 
-0.102  
(-0.56) 
0.5222 
(7.97)*** 
-0.170 
(-1.84)* 
- 
- 
0.199 
(3.56)*** 
0.258 
(2.16)** 
-0.343 
(-1.80)* 
- 
- 
 
68 
10 
0.25 
1.35 
5.91** 
0.073 
0.401 
 
H=-0.2 (F=3.56)* 
H=0.8 (F=3.13)* 
 
MColl-MComp 
0.117 
(1.73)* 
0.266 
(1.44)  
-0.026 
(-0.07) 
0.537 
(7.19)*** 
-0.190 
(-1.45) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.252 
(4.94)*** 
-0.772 
(-3.83)*** 
0.362 
(2.51)*** 
 
68 
10 
0.32 
0.66 
0.54 
- 
0.256 
 
H=-0.4 (F=3.40)* 
H=1 (F=0.54) 
  
MColl-PC 
0.150 
(5.9)*** 
0.160 
(1.79)* 
0.152 
(0.08)  
0.527 
(7.60)*** 
-0.141 
(-1.53) 
- 
- 
0.142 
(2.17)** 
0.420 
(3.51)*** 
-0.608 
(-2.54)** 
- 
- 
 
68 
10 
0.40 
3.41* 
3.62* 
0.059 
0.448 
 
H=-.1 F=4.95)** 
H=1 (F=3.62)* 
 
MColl-MComp 
0.150 
(2.77)*** 
0.160 
(1.12)  
0.152 
(0.06)  
0.527 
(5.75)*** 
-0.141 
(-1.41) 
- 
- 
0.142 
(2.02)** 
0.420 
(6.37)*** 
-0.607 
(-3.56)*** 
- 
- 
 
68 
10 
0.40 
1.90  
1.07 
- 
0.243 
 
H=-0.1 (F=3.04)* 
H=1 (F=1.07) 
  
MColl-PC 
0.078 
(1.73)* 
0.652 
(5.84)*** 
0.208 
(0.69)  
0.348 
(2.58)** 
-0.29 
(-1.86)* 
0.513 
(2.06)** 
0.572 
(2.71)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
68 
10 
0.27 
0.55 
0.04 
0.267 
0.772 
 
H=-0.9 (F=2.88)* 
H=1 (F=0.04) 
 
MColl-PC 
0.078 
(1.40)  
0.652 
(3.44)*** 
0.208 
(0.55)  
0.348 
(3.33)*** 
-0.29 
(-1.06) 
0.513 
(1.93)* 
0.572 
(2.32)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
68 
10 
0.27 
0.24 
0.03 
- 
0.796 
 
H=-1 (F=0.87) 
H=1 (F=0.03) 
  
MColl-PC 
0.088 
(1.98)* 
0.579 
(5.33)*** 
0.137 
(0.46)  
0.332 
(2.33)** 
-0.330 
(-2.16)** 
0.444 
(1.79)* 
0.492 
(2.28)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
68 
10 
0.14 
0.15 
0.49 
0.071 
0.553 
 
H=-1 (F=2.71) 
H=1 (F=0.49) 
 
MColl-PC 
0.088 
(1.62)  
0.579 
(3.58)*** 
0.137 
(0.37)  
0.332 
(3.73)*** 
-0.330 
(-1.52) 
0.444 
(1.43)  
0.492 
(1.39)  
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
68 
10 
0.14 
0.07 
0.37 
- 
0.549 
 
H=-1 (F=0.84) 
H=1 (F=0.37) 
  
MColl-PC 
Notes: Time dummies included in models 2 and 4 
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively; t -values in parenthesis 
Nobs is the number of bank-year observations; Nbank is the number of banks.  
H-value is the estimated Rosse-Panzar H-statistic  
Sargan is the p-value for the Sargan test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimates 
AR(2) is the p-value for the test for 2nd order autocorrelation for the GMM first -difference estimate residuals 
MColl = Monopoly-Collusive behaviour; MComp = monopolistic competition; PC = perfect competition 
 
 
 
